

- 1 -  
**SECRET**

8000.  
Attach 2

G.H./No 51.

February 8, 1950

The question of whether and how the ideas underlying the Tito movement can be used for serving the purposes of psychological warfare led by the United States against the Soviet Union may be answered as follows.

The strategic position of the Soviet Union in Europe has been decisively weakened by the defection of Tito and the controversy between him and Moscow. If Tito would have put up with the role of a vassal of Stalin, the Soviet Union would be in the possession of a direct approach to the Adriatic Sea and in a position to exert an immediate political pressure on Italy. In alliance with Yugoslavia entirely subservient to the Soviet Government, the Soviet Army would be in a position to accomplish a successful push into Western Europe at any given moment; an inimical Yugoslavia behind the back of the Soviet Army would make such a push a doubtful enterprise, to say the least.

Moreover, the fact that Tito succeeded in shaking off the Moscow yoke exercises a strong temptation on the satellite states of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that they would be willing to follow Tito's example if they were not so deeply impressed by the firmness of the Moscow grip.

- 1 -  
**SECRET**

# **NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

## **EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)**

- (\*) (A) Privacy ☐  
(\*) (B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(\*) (C) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

SECRET

G.H./No 51.

February 8, 1950

Diminishing this impression and persuading the satellites that their conception of the strength of the Soviet Union is exaggerated, constitutes an important task of American radio propaganda. Being aware of this, the "Voice of America" should conform its pronouncements to the general trend of the Yugoslav propaganda offensive without making discernible the existence of a mutual understanding.

For the time being, the right moment has not yet arrived to discuss the methods of bringing home the ideas of the Tito movement and its aims to the peoples of China, North Korea, Viet Nam, and Burma. After the result of the negotiations, which are being held at the present moment in Moscow between the Soviet Government and the leaders of Communist China will become known, the relative procedure will have to be decided upon. The long duration of these negotiations leaves no doubt that an agreement has not yet been reached because of the high Russian demands which the Chinese are not willing to comply with.

Only after the termination of the Moscow negotiations one will realize the best means of how to adapt the propaganda to the results of these negotiations. It goes without saying that the Communists in the Far East should be approached by the Yugoslavs and not by the Americans directly. The role of the United States should be restricted

SECRET

-3-  
SECRET

G.H./No. 51.

February 8, 1950

to facilitating the task of the Yugoslavs by providing them with technical means, experts on Eastern languages, etc.

However, in considering the possibilities of furthering the Tito movement a strong reservation should be always kept in mind. This reservation rests upon the knowledge that in the long run Tito's program may prove even more dangerous for the bourgeois-democratic world than Stalinism. This apprehension stems from the fact that Tito's striving after the purity of Communist creed and the independence from Moscow strongly appeals to the masses. The realization of Tito's ideas would free Communism from the odium of blind subservience to Moscow and thus make it attractive to many more people than now. Such a development would make the fight against Communism more difficult and complicated. Thus it might prove that the cure may be worse than the disease.

-3-  
SECRET